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Abstract
Background: In 2010, Israel intensified its adoption of Procedure-Related Group (PRG) based hospital payments, a
local version of DRG (Diagnosis-related group). PRGs were created for certain procedures by clinical fields such as
urology, orthopedics, and ophthalmology. Non-procedural hospitalizations and other specific procedures continued
to be paid for as
per-diems (PD). Whether this payment reform affected inpatient activities, measured by the number of discharges
and average length of stay (ALoS), is unclear.
Methods: We analyzed inpatient data provided by the Ministry of Health from all 29 public hospitals in Israel. Our
observations were hospital wards for the years 2008–2015, as proxies to clinical fields. We investigated the impact
of this reform at the ward level using difference-in-differences analyses among procedural wards. Those for which
PRG codes were created were treatment wards, other procedural wards served as controls. We further refined the
analysis of effects on each ward separately.
Results: Discharges increased more in the wards that were part of the control group than in the treatment wards
as a group. However, a refined analysis of each treated ward separately reveals that discharges increased in some,
but decreased in other wards. ALoS decreased more in treatment wards. Difference-in-differences results could not
suggest causality between the PRG payment reform and changes in inpatient activity.
Conclusions: Factors that may have hampered the effects of the reform are inadequate pricing of procedures,
conflicting incentives created by other co-existing hospital-payment components, such as caps and retrospective
subsidies, and the lack of resources to increase productivity. Payment reforms for health providers such as hospitals
need to take into consideration the entire provider market, available resources, other – potentially conflicting –
payment components, and the various parties involved and their interests.
Keywords: Activity-based payments, Procedure-related group (PRG), Diagnosis-related group (DRG), Hospital
financial incentives, Health-policy reform, Provider-payment reform
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Highlights
 Israel intensified adoption of PRG payments to
hospitals in 2010.
 Discharges increased in some, but decreased in
other treatment-group wards.
 ALoS decreased more in treatment-group wards.
 Difference-in-difference results could not suggest
causality of the reform for these changes.
 Payment reforms should consider the entire
provider market and payment mechanism.
Background
Payments to healthcare providers entail a set of
economic incentives that influence provider behavior
and decision-making [1, 2]. Israel adopted activity-based
payments to replace per diems (PDs) and created codes
for 30 common procedures as early as the 1990s [3].
The main objective of the change was to shorten waiting
times for expensive procedures involving brief hospital
stays, for which the PD payment was insufficient so that
hospitals were discouraged from performing them [4].
Due to data and policy constraints, Israel chose
procedure-related groups (PRGs) rather than Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs) as the basis for measuring activ-
ity. PRGs differ from DRGs in that they are defined
based on type of treatment (surgical procedure) rather
than diagnosis, and they are not adjusted for case-mix or
disease severity [5].
In the past two decades, many OECD countries
have shifted to hospital payments based on activity
and adopted diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) as
payment units but, unlike the Israeli case, their main
objectives were to increase efficiency and transparency
[6]. DRGs are still being adopted by mid-income
countries [7]. In 2002, continuing the move towards
activity-based payments, the Israeli Ministry of Health
(MoH) created PRG codes for more procedures, in
the same timing DRGs were introduced in some
OECD countries such as Estonia, Germany and the
Netherlands [6]. Since 2010, the MoH has further
expanded the application of PRGs to several clinical
specialties, in three main waves:
1. Wave 1: 2010–2012, trauma in orthopedics
2. Wave 2: 2013–2014, urology, general surgery,
ophthalmology, head and neck surgery
3. Wave 3: 2015, orthopedics and MRI
The objectives of the 2010–2015 “PRG reform”
mainly concerned transparency and a fair distribution
of funds. The specific objectives were to refine the
unit of payment and establish consistent costing and
pricing mechanisms in order to reduce cost-price
gaps, improve MoH ability to set policy and priorities,
influence the supply of hospital services by adjusting
prices, and conduct supervision and control [5].
Furthermore, PRG payments were expected to change
the incentives for hospitals. If PD payments create
incentives for longer stays, PRGs create incentives to
perform more procedures and shorten the length of
stay (LoS), to minimize operating costs and maximize
profits.
Many studies have evaluated the impact of
DRG-based payments in high- and middle-income
countries on volume of activity, LoS, and quality of
care [8–10]. In Israel, Shmueli and colleagues [11]
examined the effects of the early introduction of PRG
payments for five major procedures, one year after
implementation in 1990. They found that the volume
of activity increased for two procedures, remained
unchanged for two others, and decreased for the last
one. Regarding LoS, there was a modest decrease in
three procedures and a significant decrease in the
other two. A later study evaluated the effect of in-
corporating the time interval between hospitalization
and treatment (of hip fractures) in the PRG tariff
(maximum fees are paid for patients operated within
48 h, for those operated later, payments are signifi-
cantly lower); it found that the LoS decreased follow-
ing this change in payment method [12].
Since then, no study has evaluated the effects of the
later adoption of PRGs on hospital activity. The
effects of the 2010-reform thus remain largely
unknown, preventing evidence-informed discussion of
its benefits and challenges. The current study adds to
the previous literature both by analyzing the changes
that have occurred since then, and extending it, by
examining all the hospital data and including all the
activities performed at the ward level.
Background on the Israeli case and the hospital market
Since 1995, Israel has had a national health insurance
(NHI): four competing, non-profit health plans (HPs)
are responsible for providing and managing a broad ben-
efits package determined by the government. The HPs
provide care in the community and purchase hospital
services for their members.
Of the 44 general hospitals in Israel, 35 are
non-profit and owned by the Ministry of Health
(MoH), the municipalities, the Clalit HP or NGOs.
These are considered “public hospitals.” The other
nine are smaller, for-profit hospitals, and operate 3%
of the beds. The main source of income of Israeli
public hospitals is the sale of services to HPs and the
National Insurance Institute (NII) (see left-hand
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column in Fig. 1). Hospital reimbursement rates are
determined by a joint MoH and Ministry of Finance
(MoF) pricing committee, stipulated in the “Price List
for Ambulatory and Inpatient Services.” This max-
imum list-price (tariff ) also determines the type of
payment, which can be PD; per activity (PRG); or
fee-for-service (FFS) (see right-hand column in Fig. 1).
There are currently 24 PD rates according to ward type
and length of stay (the tariff of the first three days is higher
than the tariff of the subsequent days), about 320 PRG
codes, and more than 1600 ambulatory service codes. In
2015, 25% of the gross revenue of hospitals was for in-
patient care paid as PRGs, 37% for inpatient care paid as
PDs, 21% for ambulatory care paid as FFS or PRGs, 8% for
births paid as PRGs, 6% for emergency care paid as FFS,
and 3% from other sources such as the Ministry of
Defense or the military [13].
The sale of services covers hospital marginal costs
and some fixed costs such as physician salaries. Public
hospitals also receive “prospective subsidies” in the
form of global budgets from the MoH to cover part
of the other fixed costs such as infrastructure and
equipment. Furthermore, the government provides
“retrospective subsidies” for public hospitals with a fi-
nancial deficit at the end of each year. Both subsidies
are negotiated with both the MoH and MoF. Overall,
hospitals received about NIS 1500 million, which
roughly represents 12% of their income from govern-
ment subsidies (yellow box in Fig. 1) [13].
Israeli public hospitals are subject to two major
income constraints. The first, put in place in 2005, is
a cap mechanism; the MoH sets annual caps on hos-
pital revenues from each HP to each hospital (see
vertical arrows at right-hand side of Fig. 1). In recent
years, caps have been set as a floor (lower cap bound)
and a ceiling (upper cap bound), and are updated
every three years. The floor is a minimum payment
amount, set in 2016 as 93% of the previous year’s
expenditure for each HP to each hospital. If an HP
consumes services that, at “list prices”, would have an
aggregate cost of less than the lower cap, the HP pays
93% of the previous year’s expenditure to the hospital
in any case. The ceiling is a maximum payment
amount and when an HP spends more than this
threshold, it pays only a percentage (less than 100%)
of the full price [14]. Towards the end of the finan-
cial year, once the upper bound of the cap is reached,
there is an incentive for HP to refer patients, when
possible (e.g., for elective procedures) to the hospital
as they do not pay the full price for these services. In
2016, the hospitals’ net income was 15% lower than
the potential gross income due to discounts related to
the cap mechanism [13]. The second constraint is a
negotiated alternative reimbursement contract
Fig. 1 Public hospitals' sources of income, types of payment and cap mechanism Notes: H: hospitals, MoH: Ministry of Health, MoF: Ministry of
Finance, HP: health plan, NII: National Insurance Institute, GB: global budgets, PD: per diem, PRG: procedure-related group, FFS: fee-for-service.
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between an HP and a hospital that may supplant the
official cap, with such contracts entailing discounts
that vary across HPs and hospitals [4]. In 2015, indi-
vidual discounts represented 4% of the hospitals’ gross
income [13].
Acute hospital care in Israel has a high rate of
overcrowding, one of the highest among OECD
countries. Compared with the OECD average, Israeli
hospitals function with half the rates of acute-care
beds and nurses per population. In 2017, the average
length of stay (ALoS) in Israeli hospitals was 4 days,
one of the shortest, and occupancy rates of
acute-care beds was one of the highest among OECD
countries, reaching almost full capacity, 93%.
Nonetheless, the number of discharges per 100,000
population in Israel is almost the same as the OECD
average [15, 16].
Objectives
Our objective was to examine changes in the volume
of activity, measured by the number of discharges and
ALoS, in hospitals following the PRG reform. The
focus was on changes on the macro/system level,
aiming at draw generalizable conclusions about the
payment-policy change rather than an examination of
the impact on specific procedures or hospitals. Since
PRG codes were created in waves by clinical area, we
hypothesized increasing volumes and decreasing ALoS
in the clinical areas for which PRG codes were
created. Our analysis focuses on hospital wards as a
proxy for such clinical areas.
Economic theory suggests that hospitals react to
economic incentives derived from payment mecha-
nisms [17]. Peleg and colleagues [12] show that im-
mediately after the adoption of the refined PRG
codes, Israeli hospitals reacted by costing the wait be-
tween injury and surgery for timing of hip fracture
procedures. Based on international experience [9], it
is quite plausible that this was a reaction to the PRG
reform. However, in contrast to other OECD
countries, where DRGs were adopted to improve
efficiency, Israeli hospitals operated with relatively
limited resources even before the adoption of PRGs
in 2010, potentially limiting the hospitals’ capacity for
increased activity. The analysis of the effect of the
PRG reform on hospital volume and ALoS, in so
different an environment, thus provides an interesting
case.
Methods
The analysis is based on data on inpatient care pro-
vided by the MoH for all public general hospitals.
Our observations were of hospital wards for the years
2008–15, two years prior to the first wave of reform
(2008–10) and two years after each wave (2011–13,
period1; 2014–15, period2). The data were aggregate;
they did not apply to individual patients or the level
of procedures. Derived from HP-hospital accounts re-
ported to the MoH, the data included the following
variables: ward type, hospital code, dummy for
hospital location in the periphery, ownership (govern-
ment, HP or NGO), number of annual discharges per
ward, and annual ALoS per ward. The data related to
procedural acute-care wards. They excluded medical
wards (such as internal medicine, neurology and
pediatrics) since in medical wards there are few pro-
cedures and PRG payments. We further excluded
long-term care wards such as psychiatry, rehabilita-
tion and geriatrics; intensive-care and observation
wards since they are not good proxies for specific
medical areas; and obstetric wards because deliveries
are paid for by the NII, rather than HPs and the
reimbursement mechanism described above does not
apply (there are no caps, subsidies or negotiation of
discounts with hospitals).
To investigate changes in the number of discharges
and in ALoS, we chose a difference-in-differences
(DiD) approach that compares treatment and control
groups for the period before and after waves 1 and 2
of the PRG reform. Although there were PRG codes
before 2010, most of them were created in the 1990s
and in 2002. Thus, their impact occurred before
2008 and they should not blur the effects of the
2010–14 waves. The treatment group was composed
of procedural wards for which blocks of PRG codes
were created between 2010 and 2014. The control
group was composed of procedural wards for which
no PRG codes were created in the same period. We
analyzed the effects of the PRG reform on the num-
ber of discharges and the ALoS for waves 1 and 2
separately (Eqs. 1 and 2 below), and then the effects
on each ward (Eqs. 3 and 4), since the reform might
have affected each ward in a different manner,
direction or intensity. The first wave refers to codes
created in 2010–12 for orthopedic procedures; the
second wave, for codes created from July 2013 to
January 2014 for procedures in general surgery,
urology, ophthalmology, and head and neck surgery.
The 2015 wave is not analyzed in this work as not
enough time has passed to observe its effects. The
control group consists of pediatric surgery, cardiovas-
cular surgery, vascular surgery, plastic surgery,
gynecology, neurosurgery, oral and maxillofacial
surgery wards.
The data were analyzed using SPSS 24 version
(SPSS-IBM). We calculated the number of annual
discharges and the ALoS for each treatment and
control group. The ALoS was weighted for size of
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ward (measured by the number of discharges). The
weighting was performed to balance the relative influ-
ence of each ward on the ALoS. For example, the
relative importance of a small ward with a longer
ALoS is smaller than that of a large ward with a
shorter ALoS. The changing trends in the volume of
discharges and in ALoS are depicted in graph form.
To verify the independent impact of each wave of
PRG reform on the dependent variables (the number
of annual discharges and the ALoS per ward), we per-
formed a DiD analysis. We conducted the analysis
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. To
mitigate skewness of the dependent variables, we
transformed them with a natural logarithm. We con-
trolled for hospital, wards and year fixed effects.
We clustered the data by wards, given that the
same type of ward in different hospitals should
exhibit more robust homogeneity than different wards
within each hospital. We built one regression for each
dependent variable following the models below:
lndisit ¼ αþ β1wave1it þ β2wave2it
þ γ1period1it þ γ2period2it
þ δ1 wave1  period1ð Þit
þ δ2 wave1  period2ð Þit
þ δ3 wave2  period2ð Þit þ Ci þ ti þ e ð1Þ
lnALoSit ¼ αþ β1wave1it þ β2wave2it
þ γ1period1it þ γ2period2it
þ δ1 wave1  period1ð Þit
þ δ2 wave1  period2ð Þit
þ δ3 wave2  period2ð Þit þ Ci þ ti
þ e ð2Þ
For both equations, α represents the intercept that
captures the model’s unexplained variance. The wave
variable is a dummy for the two sets of treatment
and control groups (wave 1 for orthopedics vs. the
others; and wave 2 for general surgery, urology, oph-
thalmology, head and neck surgery vs. other proced-
ural, non-participant wards). We examined the short-
and long-term impact of wave 1 (orthopedics) and
the short-term impact of wave 2 represented in the
equation by period 1, which refers to 2011–13; and
period 2, which refers to 2014 and 2015. The coeffi-
cient of interest is δ, the DiD estimator, as it captures
the treatment groups of wards in the period after
each reform wave: δ(wave*period). δ1 and δ2 capture
the short- and long-term effects of the first wave, re-
spectively. δ3 captures the short-term effects of the
second wave of PRG expansion. The control variables,
Ci, are the fixed effects for hospitals and wards, and
Ti, for time trends (year).
In a more refined analysis, we examined the reform’s
effects in each ward separately, according to the follow-
ing models:
Indisit ¼ αþ β1orthopedicsit þ β2gensurgit
þ β2urologyit þ β2ophtalmologyit
þ β2headneckit þ γ1period1it
þ γ2period2it
þ δ1ðorthopedics  period1Þit
þ δ2ðorthopedics  period2Þit
þ δ3ðgensurg  period2Þit
þ δ4ðurology  period2Þit
þ δ4ðophthalmogy  period2Þit
þ δ6ðheadneck  period2Þit þ Ci þ ti
þ e ð3Þ
lnALoSit ¼ αþ β1orthopedicsit þ β2gensurgit
þ β2urologyit þ β2ophtalmologyit
þ β2headneckit þ γ1period1it
þ γ2period2it
þ δ1ðorthopedics  period1Þit
þ δ2ðorthopedics  period2Þit
þ δ3ðgensurg  period2Þit
þ δ4ðurology  period2Þit
þ δ4ðophthalmogy  period2Þit
þ δ6ðheadneck  period2Þit þ Ci
þ ti þ e ð4Þ
Results
Table 1 summarizes the changes in the number of
discharges and ALoS in the study period, by treatment
and control group. Figures 2 and 3 also show trends over
time. Since we excluded some wards from the analysis,
the number of discharges is smaller than the national
data reported by the MoH, ranging from 376,480 in
2008 to 410,160 in 2015, an increase of 9%; the ALoS
remained constant at 4.1 days. Our findings show that
the trends and changes in ALoS and the number of
discharges over time, in our dataset, are the same as that
recorded by the MoH.
When analyzing the changes in the number of
discharges by treatment and control group, we see that
it increased more markedly in control (non-participant)
wards (12%) compared with treatment (participant)
wards (7%). However, while refining the analysis to focus
on specific treatment wards, we observed an increase in
volume in the general surgery, orthopedics and urology
wards, but a sharp decrease in ophthalmology, and no
change in the head and neck surgery ward, despite the
high rate of population growth of 1.8% annually. The
ALoS decreased more sharply in participant wards (6%)
than in non-participant wards (1%). These results are in
line with our hypothesis that the adoption of PRGs
increases volume and shortens length of stay. A more
in-depth focus on each participant ward shows that the
ALoS decreased sharply in urology and in head and neck
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surgery (14 and 16% respectively), but remained almost
unchanged in orthopedics and urology.
Multivariable DiD analysis
The results of the multivariable DiD analysis are
presented in Table 2. Our coefficients of interest, δ,
are the DiD estimates of the interaction between the
treatment dummies (waves, coded with received treat-
ment = 1) and our period variables (2011–13 and
2014–15). The table shows results for model 1 (com-
paring treatment and control wards) and model 2
(analysis at the ward level) for both the natural loga-
rithm of number of discharges and the ALoS. In all
models, the DiD estimates were small and not signifi-
cant with the exception of the head and neck surgery
ward where the discharges and ALoS decreased by
24% and 9%, respectively.
Discussion
In our study, despite the changes seen in the descriptive
statistics, the DiD analysis could not demonstrate causality
between the PRG reform and the changing volume of hos-
pital activities or the ALoS, at least not when comparing
inpatient activities at the ward level. It is likely that the
adoption of PRGs created incentives to increase the vol-
ume of specific procedures or to change the quality of
care. However, an examination of such an impact was be-
yond the scope of this study. Rapid population growth and
aging may explain part of the volume increases while
technological innovations that allow for shorter hospital
stays may be related to the decrease in ALoS.
One plausible explanation for the counterintuitive
finding of no significant PRG-reform effect, which de-
serves further analysis, is the difference between PRG
payments and the previous PD payments for the same
procedure. If the PRG tariff is lower than the original
Table 1 Summary of changes in number of discharges and ALoS, 2008–2015, by ward
Procedural non-
participant
Procedural
participant
General
surgery
Orthopedics Urology Ophthalmology Head and neck
surgery
Discharges 2008 148,077 228,403 97,822 52,711 30,190 18,590 29,090
2015 166,478 243,681 106,219 58,799 34,563 15,219 28,881
change 18,401 15,278 8397 6088 4373 − 3371 − 209
%
change
12% 7% 9% 12% 14% −18% −1%
ALoS 2008 4.30 3.82 3.85 5.25 4.06 2.78 3.02
2015 4.26 3.59 3.59 5.39 3.49 2.72 2.53
change −0.04 −0.24 −0.26 0.14 −0.57 −0.06 −0.48
%
change
−1% −6% −7% 3% −14% −2% −16%
Notes: ALoS = average length of stay, ALoS are weighted by ward size. Reform participant (treatment) wards consist of general surgery, urology, ophthalmology,
head and neck surgery. Non-participant (control group) include pediatric surgery, cardiovascular surgery, vascular surgery, gynecology, neurosurgery, oral and
maxillofacial surgery wards
Fig. 2 Number of discharges, by type of wards
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PD payment (calculated as the PD rate times the length
of stay), the reform might not create a strong incentive
to increase volume. This might be particularly true in
Israel where the pricing mechanism is constrained and
somewhat distorted due to a budget-neutral requirement
that may lead to inaccurate prices [5]. In a 2018
qualitative study, hospital managers, ward directors, and
surgeons reported that indeed, most PRG-paid proce-
dures were underpriced [18].
A second possible explanation is that Israeli hospitals
already worked under pressure before adopting PRGs,
leaving little room for further increase of activities or
reduction of length of stay. It is possible that hospitals
simply do not have the necessary resources to treat more
patients. As mentioned, the rates of hospital beds per
population is one of the lowest among OECD countries.
Rates of physicians have declined and are expected to
drop below the OECD average in the coming decade
[19, 20]. There is a particular shortage of anesthesiolo-
gists and surgeons, causing a bottleneck for various pro-
cedures, at least in the short-term [21].
Finally, a third explanation is that other components
of the hospital payment system, such as caps and subsid-
ies, modify the incentives created by PRG payments.
Caps on hospital income can deter hospitals from in-
creasing activities beyond the ceiling. Retrospective sub-
sidies avert hospital collapse, but also reduce their fiscal
responsibility, transferring the risk to the MoH. Subsid-
ies may blur the effects of the PRG reform on hospital
activities if they are not financially responsive. Feldhaus
Fig. 3 ALoS, by type of wards
Table 2 Results of DiD analysis
DiD coefficient (δ) lndis lnALoS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Estimate δ (CI) Estimate δ (CI) Estimate δ (CI) Estimate δ (CI)
Wave1*period1 0.068 (− 0.011 0.147) 0.068 (− 0.011 0.147) 0.017 (− 0.014 0.048) 0.017 (− 0.014 0.048)
Wave1*period2 0.026 (− 0.141 0.193) 0.026 (− 0.141 0.193) −0.001 (− 0.087 0.084) − 0.001 (− 0.087 0.084)
Wave2*period2 −0.097 (− 0.291 0.097) − 0.055 (− 0.141 0.030)
General surgery*period2 −0.030 (−0.194 0.134) −0.043 (− 0.126 0.039)
urology*period2 0.030 (−0.103 0.164) −0.063 (−0.139 0.012)
Ophthalmology*period2 −0.151 (−0.307 0.005) −0.025 (− 0.105 0.054)
head neck*period2 −0.239* (−0.409 − 0.070) −0.086* (− 0.168 −0.004)
R Square 0.48 0.59 0.47 0.51
Number of cases 1828 1828 1828 1828
number of hospitals 29 29 29 29
Notes: lndis = natural logarithm of number of discharges, lnALoS = natural logarithm of average length of stay, wave 1 = orthopedics, wave 2 = general surgery,
urology, \’/ ophthalmology, head and neck surgery; period 1 = 2011–2013; period 2 = 2014–2015; CI = 95% Confidence Interval in parenthesis; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
Regression OLS, clustered by ward. ALoS were weighted by ward size. Model 1 includes reform waves as predictors, model 2 includes each ward separately
as predictors
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and Mathauer [22] also conclude that mixed or blended
provider-payment mechanisms may restrain economic
incentives. They stress that the effects of payment
reforms are highly context-specific.
Our study adds to the literature on activity-based pay-
ment and its economic incentives. Diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs) were originally developed in the US to incentivize
hospitals to provide care more efficiently [23]. In the past
two decades, many countries have shifted to hospital pay-
ment based on activity and adopted DRGs as a payment
mechanism to improve efficiency while limiting incentives
for patient selection [6]. In general, DRGs created economic
incentives to cut costs and shorten ALoS. In Western Euro-
pean countries, DRGs also created incentives to maximize
income by increasing the volume of (profitable) activities.
Yet, there is evidence that DRGs also led to decreased vol-
ume (USA) or unchanged volume (Eastern European and
Central Asian countries) [10]. Norton and colleagues [24]
found, too, that overall, hospital ALoS did not decrease in
the US when Medicaid introduced a flat episode payment
for psychiatric patients in the 1990s, replacing PD. Our
findings add another case of a country where the shift to
activity-based payments did not seem to contribute to
changing volume or a shorter ALoS.
Notwithstanding, the study has limitations that should
be taken into account:
1. Analysis on the wards level may not be sufficiently
refined to capture the effects of the reform. Currently,
about a third of the activity in procedural wards is
paid for by PRGs, which represent some 40% of the
ward income. Possibly, an increase of patients with
PRG-paid procedures in these wards was compensated
for by a reduction in the number of patients treated
with non-PRG-paid procedures.
2. Wards are not a perfect proxy for medical areas
because about 15% of discharges are transfers between
wards within a hospital, further diluting the potential
effect of the PRG reform on a specific ward. Since the
data were aggregated at the ward level, it was not
possible to exclude the transfers from the dataset. Yet,
the rate of transfers has remained constant over the
study period, so the DiD analysis should overcome
this limitation.
3. The study does not control for changes in population
needs, preferences over time or the technological
“menu” offered to patients due to ageing and changes
in the case-mix. However, we believe that the DiD
methodology overcomes the problem of ageing and
case-mix changes as it affects all wards similarly.
Conclusions
This is the first study to evaluate the impact of PRG
reform in Israel on hospital activities, as measured by
the number of inpatient discharges and the ALoS on the
national level. The study did not find any significant
effect of the PRG reform on ward-aggregate hospital
inpatient volume or the ALoS. However, our inability to
demonstrate a significant effect does not necessarily
mean that the reform did not have any effect. As noted
in the discussion, there are plausible explanations for the
finding. These include conflicting incentives created by
budget caps and subsidies, comparatively low PRG
prices, and the limited capacity of hospitals to increase
their volume because of limited resources.
Despite the counterintuitive evidence generated by this
study, the possible absence of an effect for the reform is
interesting, and warrants closer examination, because it
has implications for both researchers and policymakers
in Israel and in other countries. First, researchers con-
ducting cross-country analyses should avoid simplistic
assumptions about the effects of DRG-like payment
components on volume and length of stay; the incentives
of such payments are often modified by multiple,
co-existing payment components of a given national
hospital payment system. Second, policymakers engaging
in hospital payment reforms need to take into consider-
ation additional factors, such as the national hospital
market, available resources, other – potentially conflict-
ing – payment components, the various parties involved
and their interests. More broadly speaking, unless pay-
ment reforms are accompanied by further measures that
allow providers to respond to the changed incentives,
e.g., by making available additional resources or allowing
greater provider autonomy, the reforms are unlikely to
lead to the intended changes.
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